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THE NEW DEVELOPMENTALISM AND CONVENTIONAL 
ORTHODOXY 
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira 
RESUMO 
O fracasso das políticas e reformas propostas por Washington e Nova York, aqui 
denominadas “ortodoxia convencional”, em promover a estabilização e o crescimento econômico 
na América Latina abriu espaço para o surgimento de uma estratégia nacional de crescimento, a 
qual chamamos “novo-desenvolvimentismo”. Capitalismo, desenvolvimento econômico, nação e 
estado-nação são conceitos históricos interdependentes. O desenvolvimento do capitalismo 
depende de uma estratégia nacional que precisa de uma nação capaz de formulá-la. O antigo 
desenvolvimentismo promoveu o crescimento na América Latina desde os anos 1930, mas nos 
anos 1980 ficou ultrapassado.  Diferentemente, o novo desenvolvimentismo é orientado para as 
exportações e rejeita o protecionismo. Ambicionando um mercado e um estado fortes, apóia uma 
disciplina fiscal que vise uma poupança pública positiva. É nacionalista, porque visa o interesse 
nacional e rejeita as pressões vindas do Norte, mas é um nacionalismo liberal, social e 
republicano. Diverge fortemente da ortodoxia convencional, porque rejeita a estratégia de 
crescimento com poupança externa e a abertura da conta capital, afirma que a taxa de cambio 
pode e deve ser administrada, e que é necessária uma estratégia especial para combater taxa de 
juro alta e a moeda apreciada que mantêm a economia brasileira instável e semi-estagnada. 
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CLASSIFICAÇÃO JEL 
O (Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth) 
ABSTRACT 
The failure of the neo-liberal policies and reforms, here called ‘conventional orthodoxy’ 
in promoting macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth in Latin America opened room 
in each country for the rise of national strategy of growth which we call ‘new developmentalism’. 
Capitalism, economic development, nation and nation-state are interdependent historical 
concepts. Capitalist development depends on a national strategy that relies on a nation capable of 
formulating it. Old developmentalism was an effective strategy in promoting growth in Latin 
America since the 1930s, but in the 1980s got distorted and surpassed by the facts. Differently 
from it, new developmentalism is export oriented, rejecting protectionism. Since it wants a strong 
market and a strong state, it supports fiscal discipline aiming at positive public savings. It is 
nationalist, because it is oriented to the national interest, and rejects pressures from the North, but 
it is a liberal, social and republican nationalism. It differs strongly, however, from conventional 
orthodoxy because rejects the growth strategy with foreign savings and the opening of capital 
accounts, says that the exchange rate can and should be administered, and believes that in Brazil 
a special strategy is required to overcome the high interest rate/appreciated currency which 
maintains the Brazilian economy unstable. 
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After the failure of the neo-liberal policies prescribed by rich nations to promote macroeconomic 
stability and development, Latin America has become home to a clear movement for rejecting 
‘conventional orthodoxy’. Does this mean that today more developed countries, with sounder 
democracies, should return to the national-developmentalism of the 1950s, which was so 
successful in promoting development, but eventually became distorted and plunged into a crisis? 
Or might we consider a ‘new developmentalism’? In this paper, after examining the crisis of the 
national development strategy that was old developmentalism, I compare the rising new 
developmentalism with its earlier version, as well as with the set of diagnoses and policies rich 
nations have prescribed and pushed to developing countries since the neo-liberal ideological 
wave became prevalent worldwide: conventional orthodoxy. In the first section, I discuss old 
developmentalism, its initial success, its becoming outdated due to a series of new facts and 
distortions, and its replacement with conventional orthodoxy since the late 1980s. In the second 
section I discuss new developmentalism as a ‘third discourse’ lying between the bureaucratic left 
wing’s populism and the neo-liberalism of conventional orthodoxy. In the third section, I discuss 
the importance of the concept of nation and of the ‘national development strategy’ institution. In 
the fourth section, I compare new and old developmentalism. In the fifth, I compare it with 
conventional orthodoxy. In the sixth section, I complete the comparison, presenting two pairs of 
alternative policy ‘tripods’: the first pair opposing conventional orthodoxy and new 
developmentalism on economic growth, and the second, opposing the two strategies on 
macroeconomic policy. 
1.1.1.1  Old developmentalism and its crisis 
Between the 1930s and the 1970s, Brazil and the remaining Latin American countries grew at an 
extraordinary pace. They took advantage of the weakening of the center to formulate national 
development strategies that, in essence, implied protection of the infant national industry and the 
forced promotion of savings through the State. This strategy was called ‘developmentalism’, or 
‘national-developmentalism’. The purpose of such a name was to emphasize that, first, the  
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policy’s basic objective was to promote economic development, and, second that in order for this 
to happen, the nation — that is, businessmen, State bureaucracy, middle classes and workers 
joined together in international competition — needed to define the means to reach this objective 
within the framework of the capitalist system, with the State as principal collective action 
instrument. The notable economists that, then, studied development and made economic policy 
proposals, the politicians, government officials and businessmen that were most directly involved 
in this process were called ‘developmentalists’ because they chose development as the ultimate 
goal for their economic analysis and political action. Latin-American economists who, together 
with a group of international economists, took part in formulating ‘development economics’ were 
affiliated with three complementary schools of thought: the classical economics of Smith and 
Marx, Keynesian macroeconomics, and the Latin-American structuralist theory.
1 
Developmentalism was not an economic theory, but a national development strategy. It employed 
economic theories to formulate, for each country in the capitalist periphery, a strategy capable of 
gradually leading to the development level attained by central countries: market-based theories, 
for there is no economic theory that does not spring from the markets, but also political economy 
theories that cast the state and its institutions in a leading role as auxiliary coordinator of the 
economy. Developmentalism faced opposition from neo-classical economists that practiced 
‘conventional orthodoxy’ — that is, the set of diagnoses and economic policies and institutional 
reforms that rich, or Northern, nations prescribed to developing, or Southern, countries. They 
were called ‘monetarists’, due to the emphasis placed on monetary supply as a means to control 
inflation.  
As Brazil was a peripheral or dependent, country, whose industrial revolution was taking 
place 150 years after England’s, and more than 100 after the United States’, the remarkable 
development had between the 1930s and 1970s was only possible inasmuch as Brazil as a nation 
was able to use its state as an instrument to define and implement a national development strategy 
                                                 
1 In Brazil, the two leading economists who contributed to development economics were Celso Furtado and 
Ignácio Rangel. Given the former’s international projection, he was also part of the founding group of 
development economists, which also included Rosentein-Rodan, Arthur Lewis, Ragnar Nurkse, Gunnar 
Myrdal, Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer and Albert Hirschman.   
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where the State’s intervention was significant. This was not about replacing the market with the 
State, but, rather, about strengthening the State in order to enable it to create the required 
conditions for firms to invest so that their businessmen could innovate. All, beginning with 
England itself, required a national development strategy to bring about their industrial revolutions 
and continue to develop. The use of a national development strategy was particularly evident 
among late-development countries such as Germany and Japan, which, therefore, were never 
characterized by dependence. Peripheral countries, on the other hand, like Brazil and other Latin 
American countries, having lived through the colonial experience, remained ideologically 
dependent on the center after their formal independence. Both late-development central countries 
and former colonies needed to formulate national development strategies, but the task was easier 
for the former. For peripheral countries there was the additional hurdle of facing their own 
‘dependence’, that is, submission of the local elites to those in central countries, who were 
interested in nothing other than their own development. Developmentalism was the name given 
to national strategy of dependent countries, those whose industrialization began no earlier than 
the 1930s, or World War II. Their developmentalism was nationalist because, in order to become 
industrial, these countries needed to form their national state. The nationalism present in 
developmentalism was the ideology for forming a national state; it was the affirmation that, in 
order to develop, countries needed to define their own policies and institutions, their own national 
development strategy.
2 Although not given the same name, late central countries also used 
developmentalist strategies, as they were nationalistic, as they always followed their own criteria 
rather than their competitors’ to formulate policies, and as they used their states deliberately to 
promote development. 
In the 1940s, ‘50s and ‘60s, developmentalists and Keynesians prevailed in Latin 
America: they were the mainstream. Governments used their theories first and foremost 
economic policy-making. From the 1970s, however, in the context of the great neo-liberal, 
                                                 
2 Nationalism can also be defined, as Geller did, as the ideology that attempts to endow every nation with a 
state. Although this is a good definition, it is typical of Central Europe. In Latin America, nations were not 
yet fully formed and, still, were endowed with states. The nations, however, were incomplete, and their 
regime was semi-colonial: with independence, the main change was the dominant power, which shifted from 
Spain or Portugal to England and other major central countries.   
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conservative wave that began to form, Keynesian theory, development economics and Latin-
American structuralism were successfully challenged by neo-classical economists, who adopt a 
neo-liberal ideology in their majority. Since the 1980s, in the context of the great foreign debt 
crisis that adds to rich nations’ political power, these economists manage to redefine in neo-
liberal terms their prescriptions for developing countries. The neo-liberal ideology targeted at 
these countries becomes hegemonic, expressing itself through what became known as the 
Washington consensus, but which I prefer to call ‘conventional orthodoxy’. In other words, 
during the 1980s, the national development strategy that was developmentalism faces crisis and is 
replaced with an outside strategy: conventional orthodoxy.  
Several factors help explain this. Because old developmentalism was based on import 
substitution, it carried the seed of its own demise. Protection of national industry, the focus on the 
market and the reduction of an economy’s openness coefficient, even if a relatively large 
economy such as Brazil’s, is greatly constrained by economies of scale. For certain industries, 
protection becomes absurd. As a result, when the import-substitution model was maintained 
through the 1970s, it was leading Latin-American economies to a deep distortion. On the other 
hand, as Furtado remarked as early as 1966,
3 after the initial import substitution phase at 
consumer goods industries, continued industrialization implies a substantial increase of the 
capital-labor ratio, with two consequences: income concentration and reduced capital 
productivity, or product-capital ratio. The response to income concentration was to be an 
expanded production of luxury consumer goods, characterizing what I have termed ‘industrial 
underdevelopment model’, which, besides being perverse, carries the seed of the dissolution of 
the national pro-development alliance.  
The second reason concerns the dissolution, during the 1960s, of the national alliance that 
served as political foundation for developmentalism. The national-developmentalist approach 
assumed the constitution of a nation in each Latin-American country. A reasonable assumption, 
as, after a lengthy period of dependence that followed the independence movements of the early 
19
th Century, these countries, since 1930, take advantage of the crisis up North to begin their 
                                                 
3 Celso Furtado, Subdesenvolvimento e Estagnação da América Latina (1966)  
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national revolutions. Based on this fact, developmentalism proposed that each country’s new 
industrial businessmen should become a national bourgeoisie, as had been the case in developed 
countries, and associate itself with government officials and urban workers to bring about a 
national and industrial revolution. Therefore, in every country the sense of nation, of national 
society, was reinforced and the possibility dawned that this society might implement a national 
development strategy (developmentalism), using the state as its instrument for collective action. 
It was at once a proposal and an assessment of the reality represented by the accelerated 
industrialization process Latin America was then experiencing. The Cuban revolution of 1959, 
however, by radicalizing the left-wing, and the economic crisis of the early 1960s, led to the 
dissolution of the national alliance and set the stage for the establishment of military regimes in 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, with support from each country’s businessmen and from 
the United States. As a consequence, that alliance, so essential to the constitution of a nation, 
breaks up and Latin America’s moderate left embraces the theses of the ‘theory of associated 
dependence’ which rejected the possibility of a ‘national bourgeoisie’. In doing so, it rejected the 
very idea of nation and of national development strategy on which national-developmentalism 
was seated. The great crisis of the 1980s — the ultimate crisis endured by the import-substitution 
model that developmentalism had supported since the 1940s – further weakens it. Since then, 
developmentalism, still supported by the bureaucratic-populist left wing that formed in the 
shadow of the state because of the distortions the development strategy suffered, but with no 
support from businessmen, from the modern left, and from a large portion of the State 
bureaucracy itself, is gradually prevented from opposing the neo-liberal ideological wave that 
came from the North.
4  
The third reason for the replacement of developmentalism with conventional orthodoxy 
lies in the strength of this ideological wave. In the early 1980s, in response to the foreign debt 
crisis, conventional orthodoxy establishes itself bit by bit. The Baker Plan (1985), so called after 
US Secretary of the Treasure James Baker, completes the definition of the new ideas by adding 
market-oriented institutional reforms to orthodox macroeconomic adjustment. Developmentalism 
                                                 
4 I analyzed this crisis, which was, in broader terms a state crisis, in Bresser-Pereira (1992) A Crisis do 
Estado.  
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then becomes the target of systematic attack. Taking advantage of the economic crisis that 
derived, in part, from the overcome development model and from the distortions it had suffered 
in the hands of populist politicians and middle classes, conventional orthodoxy gives 
developmentalism a negative connotation, identifying it with populism or irresponsible economic 
policies. In its stead, it proposes a panacea of orthodox and neo-liberal institutional reforms. It 
further proposes that developing countries abandon the antiquated concept of ‘nation’ that 
national-developmentalism had adopted, and accept the globalist thesis according to which, in the 
age of globalization, nation-states had lost autonomy and relevance: worldwide free markets 
(including financial ones) would be charged with promoting the economic development of all.  
Twenty years later, what we see is conventional orthodoxy’s failure to promote Latin 
America’s economic development. While developmentalism prevailed, between 1950 and 1980, 
per capita income in Brazil grew almost 4% a year; since then, it grew for times less! The 
performance of other Latin-American countries was no different, with the exception of Chile. In 
the same period, however, dynamic Asian countries, including China since the 1980s, and India 
since the 1990s, kept or achieved extraordinary growth rates.  
Why such different growth rates? At the more immediate level of economic policies, the 
fundamental problem relates to loss of control over the most strategic macroeconomic price in an 
open economy: the foreign exchange rate. While Latin-American countries lost control over it via 
open financial accounts and saw their foreign exchange rates appreciate as, from the early 1990s, 
they accepted the proposal of growth with foreign savings from Washington and New York, 
Asian countries mostly kept current account surpluses, as well as retained control over their 
foreign exchange rates. At the reforms level, while Latin-American countries indiscriminately 
accepted all liberalizing reforms, irresponsibly privatizing monopoly utilities and opening their 
capital accounts, Asians were more prudent. However, it gradually became clear to me that the 
man difference was to be found in a new, fundamental fact: Latin-American countries interrupted 
their national revolutions, watched as their nations disorganized, lost cohesiveness and autonomy 
and, as a consequence, were left without a national development strategy. The national strategy 
Latin American countries in general and Brazil in particular adopted between 1930 and 1980 was 
known as developmentalism. In this period, and mainly from 1930 to 1960, many Latin- 
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American countries were firmly steadfastly their nations, finally providing their formally 
independent stats with a basic solidarity when it came to competing internationally. But the 
weakening brought about by the great crisis of the 1980s, combined with the hegemonic force of 
the ideological wave that began in the United States in the 1970s, caused the constitution of 
Latin-American nations to interrupt itself and regress. Local elites stopped thinking with their 
own heads and accepted the advice and pressure from the North, while countries, devoid of a 
national development strategy, saw their development come to a stall. Conventional orthodoxy, 
which came to replace national-developmentalism, had not been developed locally; it did not 
reflect national concerns and interests, but, rather, the visions and objectives of rich nations. In 
addition, as is typical of the neo-liberal ideology, it was a negative proposal that assumed the 
markets’ ability to coordinate everything automatically, proposing that the stat stop playing the 
economic role it always had in developed countries: that of supplementing the market’s 
coordination to promote economic development and equity.  
I have been critical of conventional orthodoxy ever since it became dominant in Latin 
America. I was, probably, the first Latin-American economist to criticize the Washington 
Consensus at my keynote lecture during the annual congress of the National Association of Post-
Graduate Economics Courses, in 1990.
5 My criticism, however, gained a new dimension since 
the first quarter of 1999, after four and a half years as a member of the Cardoso administration. 
Then I wrote, in Oxford, “Incompetência and confidence building por trás de 20 anos de quase-
estagnação da América Latina”.
6 Soon thereafter, resuming by association with Yoshiaki Nakano, 
who was also fresh out from an experience in government, we co-authored “Uma estratégia de 
desenvolvimento com estabilidade” and “Crescimento Econômico com Poupança Externa?”.
7 
Loyal to the original spirit of developmentalism and to our Keynesian and structuralist 
background, with these works we began a systematic and radically non-populist criticism of the 
conventional orthodoxy that had become prevalent in Latin America, offering an alternative 
                                                 
5 Bresser-Pereira (1990 [1991]) "A crise da América Latina: Consenso de Washington ou crise 
fiscal?" 
6 Bresser-Pereira (1999[2001]). 
7 Bresser Pereira and Nakano (2002 and 2002 [2003])  
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economic policy.
8 Our criticism showed that the conventional proposal, albeit inclusive of certain 
necessary policies and reforms, did not in fact promote a country’s development, but kept it semi-
stagnant, incapable of competing with wealthier countries, easily falling prey to a form of 
economic populism: foreign exchange populism.  
The alternative economic strategy alternative that is implicitly or explicitly present in 
these works and others we produced subsequently, in addition to not running into the distortions 
developmentalism suffered in its latter days, innovated by acknowledging a series of new 
historical facts that implied a need to review the national development strategy. How to name this 
alternative? In early 2003, in a conversation with Nakano about this matter, he suggested ‘new 
developmentalism’, which I immediately accepted.
9 At the moment I was finishing the fifth 
edition of Desenvolvimento e Crise no Brasil, and, in addition to including the new ideas in its 
final chapter, “Retomada da revolução nacional e novo desenvolvimentismo”, I used the term for 
the first time in a written work.
10 In 2004 I published an article so titled in the Folha de S. Paulo 
newspaper.
11 That same year, João Sicsú, Luiz Fernando de Paula and Renaut Michel organized 
the book Neo-desenvolvimentismo: Um Projeto Nacional de Crescimento com Eqüidade Social 
— gathering some of the new generation’s top economists. New developmentalism thus grew 
from an isolated proposal into a more general project.
12 
What does new developmentalism involve? I introduce it in this work. In the first section, 
I define it as a ‘third discourse’ and a national development strategy; in the second section, I 
                                                 
8 In fact, we had begun this work in our period in the Ministry of Finance (1987), myself as minister and he 
as Secretary for Economic Policy. We then went to war against the populist elements within PMDB, while 
rejecting the mere adoption of the conventional orthodoxy that the IMF and the World Bank then prescribed 
for Brazil. 
9 We also considered using ‘developmentalist orthodoxy’, given that new developmentalism is at least as 
strict as conventional orthodoxy in terms of fiscal discipline. The term ‘orthodoxy’, however, suggests a lack 
of flexibility and, therefore, of pragmaticism, which is incompatible with a national development strategy. 
10 Bresser-Pereira (2003: Capítulo 20) “Retomada da revolução nacional  and novo desesnvolvimentismo”. 
11 Bresser-Pereira (2004) “O novo desesnvolvimentismo”. 
12 As I write this (early 2006), Sicsú and de Paula have submitted to Revista de Economia Política an article 
titled “Novo Desesnvolvimentismo”, still pending peer review. A seminar coordinated by José Luís Oreiro 
and Luiz Fernando de Paula is set to take place at Universidade Federal do Paraná in 2006, with new 
developmentalism as topic.  
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establish its differences from the 1950s’ developmentalism; and, in the third section, I show how 
it stands as a critique and alternative to conventional orthodoxy, that is, to the diagnoses, policies 
and reforms conceived mainly in Washington for use in developing countries. 
1.1.1.2 Nation  and  nationalism 
New developmentalism, as the national-developmentalism of the 1950s, at once assumes the 
presence and implies the formation of a true nation, capable of formulating an informal, open, 
national development strategy, as is proper of democratic societies whose economies are 
coordinated by the market. A nation is a society of individuals or households that, sharing a 
common political fate, manages to organize itself as a state with sovereignty over a certain 
territory. A nation, therefore, like the modern state, only makes sense within the nation-state 
framework that arises with capitalism. For a nation to be able to share a common fate ela it must 
have common objectives, chief among which, in historical terms, the objective of development. 
Other objectives, such as freedom and social justice, are also fundamental to nations, but, like the 
state and capitalism, arise with economic development as part of its reasoning, of its intrinsic 
manner of being. Nations, nation-states, capitalism and economic development are simultaneous 
and intrinsically correlated historical phenomena. In its most developed form — today’s 
globalization —capitalism’s economic constituents are not only firms operating at the 
international level, but also, if not mainly, nation-states or national states. It is not just firms that 
compete worldwide in the markets, as conventional economic theory proposes: nation-states, too, 
are fundamental competitors. The main criterion for success for the political rules of every 
modern nation-states is comparative economic growth. Rulers are successful in the eyes of their 
people and internationally if they achieve greater growth rates than countries regarded as direct 
competitors. Globalization is the stage of capitalism where, for the first time, nation-states span 
the entire globe and compete economically through their firms.  
A nation involves a basic solidarity among classes when it comes to competing 
internationally. Businessmen, workers, state bureaucrats, middle-class professionals and 
intellectuals may come into conflict, but know they share a common fate, and that this fate relies 
on their successful competitive involvement in the world of nation-states. It involves, therefore, a  
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national agreement. A national agreement is the basic social contract that gives rise to a nation 
and keeps it strong or cohesive; it is the compact among social classes of a modern society that 
enables this society to become a true nation, that is, a society gifted with a state capable of 
formulating a national development strategy. The great national agreement or compact that 
established itself in Brazil since 1930 joined the infant national industrial bourgeoisie toi the new 
bureaucracy or the new state technicians; add to these urban workers and more domestic market-
oriented sectors of the old oligarchy, such as the ranchers from which Vargas came. Their 
adversaries were imperialism, represented mainly by British and American interests, and the 
affiliated exporting rural oligarchy. The most strategic accord in a modern nation-state is that 
between industrial businessmen and the State bureaucracy, which includes significant politicians, 
but also workers and as middle classes. And there will always be domestic adversaries, somehow 
identified with imperialism or today’s colony-less neo-imperialism, as well as with local 
collaborationist or globalist groups. In the case of Brazil, today, it is rentiers that rely on high 
interest rates and the financial industry, which collects commissions from the former. 
A nation is always nationalist, inasmuch as nationalism is the ideology of the formation of 
a national state and its permanent reaffirmation or consolidation. Another way to define 
nationalism is to say, after Ernest Gellner, that it is the ideology that pursues a correspondence 
between nation and state, that stands for the existence of a state for each nation.
13 This, too, is a 
good definition, but one typical of a thinker from Central Europe; a definition that becomes 
exhausted as soon as a nation-state is formed — when nation and state begin coinciding over a 
given territory, formally establishing a ‘sovereign state’. It fails therefore, to take into account 
Ernest Renan celebrated 1882 sentence: “a nation is a daily referendum”.
14 It fails to explain how 
a nation-state may formally exist in the absence of a true nation, as is the case of Latin-American 
countries, which, in the early 19th Century, saw themselves endowed with state due not only to 
                                                 
13 Gellner, a Czech philosopher who took refuge from communism in England, was probably the most argute 
analyst of nationalism in the second half of the 20
th Century: Gellner (1983, 1993). 
14 Ernest Renan (1882 [1992]: 55. In the immediately preceding part, Renan wrote: “A nation is a great 
solidarity made up of the sentiment of the sacrifices made and those people are still willing to make. It 
assumes a past; its present summation  is a tangible fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire to go on 
with common life.”  
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the patriotic efforts of nationalist groups, but also to the good services of England, whose aim 
was to oust Spain and Portugal from the region. In this way, these countries saw themselves 
endowed with a state in the absence of true nations, as they ceased to be colonies and became 
dependent on England, France, and, later, the United States. For a true nation to exist, the several 
social classes must, despite the conflicts that set them apart, be solidary when it comes to 
competing internationally, and us national criteria to make policy decisions, particularly those 
that involve economic policy and institutional reform. In other words, the rulers must think with 
their own heads instead of dedicating themselves to confidence building, and the entire society 
must be capable of formulating a national development strategy.   
New developmentalism will become a reality when the national society becomes a true 
nation. This is what happened in Brazil between 1930 and 1980, particularly from 1930 to 1960. 
Under the rule of Brazil’s 20
th century statesman, Getúlio Vargas, the country took national 
decisions into its own hands and formulated a successful national development strategy. In those 
30 years (or 50, should we include the military period, which remained nationalist, despite its 
political alliance with the United States against communism), Brazil changed from am 
agricultural into an industrial country, grew from a mercantilist social formation to a fully 
capitalist one, from a semi-colonial to a national status. Developmentalism was the name given to 
the national development strategy and to its driving ideology. Therefore, the process of defining 
the new developmentalism equally involves resuming the idea of nation in Brazil and other Latin 
American countries. It implies, therefore, a nationalist perspective in the sense that economic 
policies and institutions must be formulated and implemented with national interest as their main 
criterion and with each country’s citizens as actors. Such a nationalism aims not to endow a 
nation with a state, but to turn the existing state into an effective instrument for collective action 
by the nation, an instrument that enables modern nations, in the early 21
st Century to consistently 
pursue their political objectives of economic development, social justice and freedom within an 
international framework of competition, but also peace and collaboration, among nations. It 
implies, therefore, that such nationalism be liberal, social and republican, that is, that it 
incorporate the values of modern industrial societies.  
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1.1.1.3  The ‘third discourse’ and the national development strategy 
New developmentalism is, at once, a ‘third discourse’ lying between the populist discourse and 
the discourse of conventional orthodoxy, and the set of diagnoses and ideas that should e the 
guidelines for each nation-state’s national development strategy formulation. It is the set of 
institutional-reform economic-policy proposals through which medium development nations 
attempt, in the early twenty-first Century, to catch up with developed countries. Like the old 
developmentalism, it is not an economic theory: it is based mainly on Keynesian 
macroeconomics and development economics, but us a national development strategy. It is the 
means by which countries like Brazil may successfully compete — and gradually catch up — 
with rich nations. It is the set of ideas that enables developing nations to refuse rich nations’ 
proposals and pressures for reform and economic policy, like a fully open capital account and 
growth with foreign savings, inasmuch as such proposals are neo-imperialist attempts to 
neutralize development — the ‘kicking away the ladder’ practice. It is the means by which 
businessmen, government officials, workers and intellectuals can stand as a true nation to 
promote economic development. I do not include poor countries into the new developmentalism, 
not because they do not require a national development strategy, but because, still in need to 
accomplish their primitive accumulation and industrial revolutions, the challenges they face and 
the strategies they will require are different.   
In terms of discourse or ideology, we have, on the one hand, the dominant, imperial and 
globalist discourse that flows from Washington and is embraced in Latin America by the neo-
liberal, cosmopolitan right wing comprised mainly of the rentier class and the financial 
industry.
15 This is conventional orthodoxy: an ideology exported to developing countries; an anti-
national strategy that, despite its generous offer to promote prosperity among medium 
development countries, in fact serves rich nations’ interest in neutralizing these countries’ ability 
to compete. This, as it was applied in Brazil since the 1990s, has four things to say: first, that the 
country’s major problem is the lack of microeconomic reforms capable of enabling the market to 
                                                 
15 By ‘rentier class’ we mean no longer the class of large landowners, but that of inactive capitalists whose 
livelihood relies mainly on interest income. The ‘financial industry’, in turn, involves, besides rentiers, 
businessmen and managers who collect commissions from rentiers.  
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operate freely; second, that even after the end of runaway inflation, in 1994, controlling inflation 
remains the main purpose of economic policy; third, that, in order to achieve such control, 
interest rates must be inevitably high because of the sovereign risk and of fiscal issues; fourth, 
that ‘development is a great race among countries to obtain foreign savings’, and that the implicit 
current account deficits and foreign exchange appreciation brought about by capital inflows are 
no cause for concern. The disastrous effects of this discourse in terms of balance of payments 
crises and low growth for Latin-American countries that adopted it since the late 1980s are well 
known today.
16  
The opposite discourse is that of the bureaucratic-populist left wing. From this 
perspective, Brazil’s ills are due to globalization and financial capital, which placed the country 
under the burden of high foreign and public indebtedness. The proposed solution was to 
renegotiate the country’s foreign and public at a great discount. The second ill lied with 
insufficient demand, which could be resolved with increased public spending. And the greatest ill 
— unequal income distribution — could be solved by expanding the Brazilian welfare system. 
This alternative was used, for example, in Peru under Alan Garcia. In Brazil, it was never fully 
put into practice.
17   
The first discourse served the interests of the North and reflected its deep ideological 
hegemony over Latin-American countries. Locally, it sprung chiefly from the Brazilian rentier 
class, who depends essentially in interest for a living, and from economists affiliated with the 
financial industry; a confused, disoriented upper-middle class also shared it. The second came 
from the lower-middle class and labor unions, reflecting the old bureaucratic left wing’s 
perspective. Neither discourse had a chance of reaching a reasonable consensus in Brazilian 
society, due to their irrationality and biased nature. Neither ideology reflected national interests. 
Might there be a third discourse capable of achieving such a reasonable consensus? Certainly, 
this third is possible and is being formulated, little by little. It is the discourse of new 
                                                 
16 See Frenkel (2003). 
17 The Workers Party, PT, adopted such discourse in Brazil, but once in power, in 2003, adopted policies 
recommended by conventional orthodoxy.  
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developmentalism. But is not new developmentalism also an ideology, as are conventional 
orthodoxy and the bureaucratic-populist discourse? Yes and no. Yes, because every national 
strategy implies an ideology — a set of political action-oriented ideas and values. And no, 
because unlike conventional orthodoxy, which is no more than an outside proposal, new 
developmentalism will only make sense if it rises from internal consensus and, therefore, stands 
as a true national development strategy. A full consensus is impossible, but a consensus that 
brings together businessmen from the production sector, workers, government officials and 
middle-class professionals — a national agreement, therefore — is now forming, taking 
advantage of the failure of conventional orthodoxy. This forming consensus regards globalization 
as neither a blessing nor a curse, but as a system of intense competition among national states 
through their firms. It realizes that, in such a competition, the State must be strengthened fiscally, 
administratively and politically, and, at the same time, provide national firms with the conditions 
to become internationally competitive. It acknowledges, as Argentina has already done after its 
2001 crisis, that development in Brazil is prevented, in the short term, by exceedingly high short-
term interest rates determined by the Central Bank, which push long-term rates upwards and 
uncouple them from sovereign risk. It assumes that, for development to occur, investment rates 
must by necessity rise, and the state must contribute by means of positive public savings, the fruit 
of curbing current or consumption state expenditures. Finally, and more generally, new 
developmentalism assumes that development, in addition to being prevented by the absence of 
democratic nationalism (an absence that favors conventional orthodoxy), is also hampered by 
income concentration, which, besides unfair, is a culture medium for all forms of populism, and, 
thus, for the bureaucratic-populist discourse. 
What is a national development strategy? More than a simple ideology developed abroad 
like conventional orthodoxy, it is a set of economic development-oriented institutions and 
policies. It is less of a national development project or plan because it is not formal, it lacks a 
document that accurately describes objectives to be attained and policies to be implemented in 
order to attain such objectives, because the inherent accord among social classes has neither text 
nor signatures. And it is more, because it informally comprehends all of society, or a large share 
thereof. Because it shows all a path to tread, and certain very general guidelines to be observed.  
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Because, although it does not assume a conflict-free society, it does require a reasonable union of 
all when it comes to competing internationally. Because it is more flexible than a project. 
Because it always considers the actions of other opponents or competitors. Because the factor that 
drives individual behavior is not just personal interest, but competition with other nations. A 
national development strategy reflects all this. Its leadership befalls the government and the more 
active elements of civil society. Its fundamental instrument is the state itself: its norms, policies 
and organization. Its outcome, when a major accord establishes itself, when strategy becomes 
truly national, when society begins sharing, loosely but effectively, methods and goals, is 
accelerated development — a period during which the country enjoys high per capita income and 
living standards growth rates. 
A national development strategy implies a set of fundamental variables for economic 
development. These variables are real and institutional alike. The nation’s increased savings and 
investment capacities, the means by which it incorporates technical advances into production, 
human capital development, increased national social cohesiveness resulting in social capital or 
in a stronger, more democratic civil society, a macroeconomic policy capable of assuring the 
state’s and the nation-state’s financial health, leading to conservative domestic and foreign 
indebtedness ratios, are all constituents of a national development strategy. In this process, 
institutions, instead of mere one-size-fits-all abstractions, are seen and construed concretely, 
historically. A national development strategy will gain meaning and strength when its institutions 
— be they short-terms ones I call policies or public policies, be they relatively permanent ones 
(institutions proper) — respond to societal needs, when they are compatible with the economy’s 
production factors endowment, or, put more broadly, with the elements that make up society at its 
structural level. 
1.1.1.4  Old and new developmentalism 
The developmentalism of the 1950s and the new developmentalism differ based on two variables 
that arose in this half-century: on the one hand, new historical facts that changed world 
capitalism, which moved from its ‘golden years’ to the ‘globalization’ phase; on the other hand, 
medium development countries like Brazil changed their own development stages and are no 
longer marked by infant industries.   
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The main change at the international level was from the capitalism of the golden years 
(1945-1975), when the welfare state was assembled and Keynesianism ruled, while development 
economics prevailed as a theory and a practice of economic development, to the neo-liberal 
capitalism of globalization, where growth rates are smaller and competition among nation-states 
is far fiercer. In the golden years, medium development countries still posed no threat to rich 
nations. Since the 1970s, however, with the NICs (newly industrializing countries), and since the 
1990s, with China, their competition becomes much greater: the threat their cheap labor poses 
rich nations is clearer than ever. At that time, rich nations, and the United States in particular, in 
need of allies for the Cold War, were far more generous; today, only the poorest African 
countries can expect some generosity — but event these must be wary, because the treatment rich 
nations and the World Bank afford them, and the help, or alleged help, they receive are often 
perverse.  
The main difference, at the national level, concerns the fact that industry was in its 
infancy at that time; it is now mature. The import-substitution model was effective, between the 
1930s and the 1960s, to establish the industrial bases of Latin American countries. Since the 
1960s, however, they should have begun dropping protectionist barriers and orienting themselves 
towards an export-led model under which they might show themselves as competitive 
manufactured goods exporters. They did not, however, until forced to by the crisis of the 1980s, 
and then often hurriedly and haphazardly. This 20-year lag was one of the greatest distortions 
endured by the developmentalism of the 1950s.  
New developmentalism is not protectionist. It assumes that medium development 
countries have already overcome the infant industry stage, requiring firms to be competitive in all 
industries where they operate and to be particularly competitive in some to be able to export. 
Unlike old developmentalism, which embraced the exporting pessimism of development 
economics, new developmentalism is not so affected. Like any development strategy, it does not 
intend to base growth on the export of low value added primary products, but, instead, lays odds 
on developing countries’ ability to export medium value added manufactured goods or high value 
added primary products. The experience of the past 30 years has clearly shown that this 
pessimism was one of the great theoretical mistakes of development economics. In the late 1960s,  
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Latin American countries should have begun shifting decisively from the substituting to the 
export-led model, as did Korea and Taiwan. In Latin America, Chile was the first to operate such 
a change and, as a result, its development is often pointed out as an example a successful neo-
liberal strategy. In fact, neo-liberalism was only fully practiced in Chile between 1973 and 1981, 
coming to an end with a major balance of payments crisis in 1982.
18 The export-led model is not 
specifically neo-liberal because, strictly speaking, the neo-classical economic theory that 
underlies this ideology has no room for development strategies. Dynamic Asian countries, having 
adopted a developmentalist strategy in the 1950s, lent it a manufactured goods exporting nature 
in the 1960s and, since the 1970s at least, can be regarded as neo-developmentalists countries. 
The export-led model has two main advantages over the imports substitution model. Firstly, the 
market available to industries is not constrained to the domestic market. This is important for 
small countries, but equally fundamental to a country with a relatively large domestic market 
such as Brazil. Secondly, if a country adopts this strategy, economic authorities, making 
industrial policy in benefit of their firms, get access to an efficiency criterion to guide themselves 
by: only firms that are efficient enough to export will benefit from the industrial policy. In the 
case of the import-substitution model, very inefficient firms may be enjoying the benefits of 
protection; in the case of the export-led model, the likelihood of this happening is substantially 
smaller.  
The fact that the strategy new developmentalism stands for is not protectionist does not 
mean that countries should be willing to accept indiscriminate openness. They must negotiate  
pragmatically at the level of the World Trade Organization and regional accords to secure mutual 
openness. And, above all, it does not mean that the country should give up industrial policies. 
Room for these has been reduced by the highly unfavorable agreements made in the WTO’s 
Uruguay Round, but there still room for such policies, if considered strategically, in consideration 
of future comparative advantages that may arise as some supported firms achieve success. 
New developmentalism rejects misled notions of growth based chiefly on demand and 
public deficit that became popular in Latin America in the 1960s. This was one of the most 
                                                 
18 See Dias-Alejandro (1981); Ffrench-Davis (2003).  
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severe distortions developmentalism endured in the hands of its populist latter-day advocates. 
The theoretical roots of this national development strategy lie not in Keynesian macroeconomics 
and in development economics, which, in turn, is seated mainly on classical economics. Keynes 
pointed out the importance of aggregate demand and legitimized resorting to public deficits in 
recessive periods. But he never stood for chronic public deficit. He always assumed that a fiscally 
balanced national economy might, for a brief while, give up this balance to reestablish 
employment levels.
19 The notable economists, such as Furtado, Presbisch and Rangel, who 
formulated the developmentalist strategy, were Keynesian, and, regarded aggregate demand 
management as an important tool for promoting development. But they never defended the 
economic populism of chronic deficits. Those that came in their wake, however, did. When Celso 
Furtado, faced with the severe crisis of the early 1960s, proposed his Plano Trienal (1963), these 
second-class followers accused him of having an ‘orthodox rebound’. In fact, what Furtado 
already saw and the new developmentalism firmly defends, is fiscal balance. New 
developmentalism defends it not due to ‘orthodoxy’, but because of the realization that the state 
is the nation’s par excellence collective action instrument. If the state is so strategic, its apparatus 
must be strong, sound, capacious and, for this very reason, its finances must be in balance. More 
than this, its debt must be small and long in maturity. The worst thing that can happen to a state 
as an organization (the state also stands for the rule of Law) is to be in thrall of creditors, be they 
domestic or foreign. Foreign creditors are particularly dangerous, as they may, at any time, leave 
the country with their capital. Domestic ones, however, transformed into rentiers and supported 
by the financial system, can impose disastrous economic policies on the country, as has been the 
case in Brazil. 
Chart 1: Old and new developmentalism, compared 
Old developmentalism  New developmentalism 
State plays a leading role in terms 
of forced savings and investment in 
State has a subsidiary, but 
important, role in both activities 
                                                 
19 See Bresser-Pereira and Dall’Acqua (1991).  
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firms  
Protectionist and pessimistic  Export-led and realistic  
A certain fiscal lassitude  Fiscal discipline 
A certain complacency towards 
inflation 
No complacency towards inflation 
 
The third and final difference between the developmentalism of the 1950s and new 
developmentalism can be found in the state’s role in promoting forced savings and investing in 
the economic infrastructure. Both forms of developmentalism cast the state in a leading role as 
regards assuring the proper operation of the market and providing general conditions for capital 
accumulation, such as education, health and transportation, communications and power 
infrastructures. In addition, however, under the developmentalism of the 1950s the state also 
played a crucial role in promoting forced savings, thereby contributing to countries’ primitive 
accumulation process; furthermore, the made direct investments in infrastructure and heavy 
industry, where the investments required were too high for the private sector’s savings.  
This has changed since the 1980s. For the new developmentalism, the state still can and 
must promote forced savings and invest in certain strategic industries, but the national private 
sector now has the resources and managerial ability to perform a sizable portion of the 
investments needed. The new developmentalism rejects the neo-liberal thesis that ‘the state no 
longer has resources,’ because the state having resources or not depends on how its apparatus’s 
finances are managed. But the new developmentalism understands that, in all sectors where 
reasonable competition exists, the state must not be an investor, concentrating, instead, in 
defending and assuring competition. Even after these have been excluded, there are many 
investments left to the state, financed by public savings, rather than debt.  
In sum, and again, in reflection of the different stage where medium development 
countries are at, new developmentalism regards the market as a more efficient institution, one 
more capable of coordinating the economic system, than did the old developmentalists although it 
is far from conventional orthodoxy’s irrational faith in the market.  
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1.1.1.5 New  developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy 
Let us now examine the differences between new developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy. 
A conventional economic orthodoxy or conventional economic knowledge is made up of the set 
of theories, diagnoses and policy proposals rich nations offer developing countries. It is based on 
neo-classical economics, but not to be confused with it because it is not theoretical, but openly 
ideological and oriented towards proposing institutional reforms and economic policies. While 
neo-classical economics is based on universities, particularly in the US, conventional orthodoxy 
springs mainly from Washington, home to the United States Treasury Department and to the two 
agencies that are supposedly international, but in fact subordinate to the Treasury: the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the former charged with macroeconomic 
policy, the latter with development. Secondarily, it is originated in ‘New York’, that is, the seat 
or point of convergence of major international banks and multinationals. Therefore, we may say 
that conventional orthodoxy is the set of diagnoses and policies intended for developing countries 
and originating in Washington and New York. Conventional orthodoxy changes over time. Since 
the 1980s, it has become identified with the ‘Washington Consensus’, which cannot be 
understood simply as a list of 10 reforms or adjustments John Williamson wrote down on the 
paper that gave birth to the expression. His list even included reforms and adjustments that are 
indeed necessary.
20 The Washington Consensus is, in fact, the effective shape the neo-liberal and 
globalist ideology has taken at the level of economic policies recommended to developing 
countries. In some works, I distinguish between the First and Second Washington Consensus, to 
highlight that the former, materialized in Williamson’s list, is concerned mostly with the 
macroeconomic adjustment that became needed as a result of the great debt crisis of the 1980s, 
while the second, prevalent since the 1990s, also intends to operate as a development strategy 
based on an open capital account and on growth with foreign savings. They form, however, a 
single consensus — that of rich nations in relation to their competitors, the medium development 
countries. Although the term Washington Consensus is useful, I prefer to conventional 
orthodoxy, because it is more generic and portrays a certain ‘orthodoxy’ as merely 
                                                 
20 Williamson (1990).  
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conventional.
21 Conventional orthodoxy is the means by which the United States, at the level of 
economic policies and institutions, express their ideological hegemony over the rest of the world, 
and mainly over dependent developing countries who lack nations strong enough to challenge 
this hegemony, as has been traditionally the case of Latin-American countries. This hegemony 
purports to be ‘benevolent’, while, in fact, it is the arm and mouth of neo-imperialism — that is, 
imperialism without (formal) colonies that established itself under the aegis of the United States 
and other rich nations after the classic colonial system ceased to exist, after World War II.  
Inasmuch as conventional orthodoxy is the practical expression of the neo-liberal 
ideology, it is the ideology of the market vs. the state. While new developmentalism wants a 
strong state and a strong market, and sees no contradiction between them, conventional 
orthodoxy wishes to strengthen the market by weakening the state, as if the two institutions were 
party to a zero-sum game. Since the second half of the 20th Century, therefore, conventional 
orthodoxy has been a version of the laissez faire that prevailed in the previous century. 
Disregarding the fact that the state has grown in terms of tax load and of the level of market 
regulation as a result of the increased dimensions and complexity of modern societies, 
disregarding the fact that a strong and relatively large stat is a requirement for a strong and 
competitive market, conventional orthodoxy is the practical reaction against the growth of the 
state’s apparatus. Certainly the state has also grown out of mere clientelism, to create jobs and 
employ the bureaucracy, but conventional orthodoxy is not interested in distinguishing legitimate 
state growth from the illegitimate. It is the ideology of the minimal state, of the police state, of 
the state that is concerned only with domestic and foreign security, leaving economic 
coordination, infrastructure investments and even social services like health and education to the 
devices of the market. It is the individualistic ideology that assumes all are equally capable of 
defending their interests. It is, therefore, a right-wing ideology, and ideology of the powerful, the 
rich, the better educated — the high bourgeoisie and the high techno-bureaucracy. Its goal is to 
                                                 
21 I have no sympathy for orthodoxy, which is a way to renounce thinking, and none for unorthodoxy where 
the economist, upon identifying himself as unorthodox, renounces seeing his ideas and policies in action, 
reserving himself the role of eternal minority opposition. A good economics is neither orthodox nor 
unorthodox, but pragmatic: he can make good economic policy based on an open, modest theory that forces 
him to constantly consider and decide under conditions of uncertainty.   
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drive down direct and indirect real wages by leaving labor unprotected, and, thus, making forms 
more competitive in an international market of developing countries and cheap labor.  
The first and most general difference between new developmentalism and conventional 
orthodoxy was referred to in the foregoing section’s final paragraph. Conventional orthodoxy is a 
market fundamentalist, believes that ‘in the beginning there was the market,’ an entity that 
coordinates all optimally as long as it is free, while new developmentalism holds no such beliefs. 
It regards the market as a remarkably efficient institution when it comes to coordinating 
economic systems, but is aware of the market’s limitations. Factor allocation is the task it 
performs best, but even there problems arise. Incentives to investment and innovation leave much 
to be desired. And, at the level of income distribution, it is completely unsatisfactory a 
mechanism, as the markets privilege the strongest and most capable. While conventional 
orthodoxy does acknowledge the market’s shortcomings, but argues that they are better than 
those of the state in attempting to correct them, new developmentalism rejects this pessimism 
towards the capacity for collective action and yearns for a strong state, not at the cost of the 
market, but in order for the market to be strong. If Man is capable of building institutions to 
regulate human actions, including the market itself, there is no reason why Man should not be 
able to strengthen the state as an apparatus or organization, making its rule more legitimate, its 
finances sounder, and its management more efficient; and to strengthen the state as a rule of law, 
making its institutions ever more closely aligned with social needs. This is precisely what politics 
and democracy are for.  
As one of the bases for new developmentalism is classical economics, essentially a theory 
like Smith’s ‘wealth of nations’, or Marx’s ‘capital accumulation’, social structures and 
institutions are fundamental to it. In addition, as it embraces a historical perspective of 
development, the institutionalist teachings of the German historical school and of the American 
institutionalism of the early 20th Century are essential elements of its vision of development.
22 
Institutions are, therefore, fundamental; and reforming them is a constant need inasmuch as, in 
                                                 
22 The German historical school is the school of Gustav Schmoller, Otto Rank, Max Weber, and, along a 
different path Friedrich List; the American institutionalist school is the school of Thorstein Veblen, Wesley 
Mitchell and John R. Commons.  
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our complex, dynamic societies, economic activities and the market must be constantly re-
regulated. New developmentalism is, therefore, reformist. Conventional orthodoxy, on the other 
hand, based as it is on the neo-classical theory, has only recently become aware of the importance 
of institutions, with the emergence of the ‘new institutionalism’. Unlike historical 
institutionalism, which, at the level of economic development, regards pre-capitalist institutions 
and the distortions of capitalism as obstacles to development and tries to develop institutions to 
actively promote it, the new institutionalism is simplistic in its proposal: all institutions need to 
do is assure property and contracts or, more broadly, the proper operation of the markets, and the 
markets themselves will automatically promote development. In the neo-liberal jargon found, for 
example, in The Economist, a government is economically good if it is ‘reformist’ — where 
reformist means making market-oriented reforms. For new developmentalism, a government will 
be economically good if it is ‘developmentalist’ — if it promotes development and income 
distribution via the adoption of economic policies and institutional reforms oriented, as far as 
possible, towards the market, but often correcting these markets’ automatic actions. In other 
words, if it can rely on a national development strategy, for this is no more than this set of 
institutions and economic policies aimed at the proper operation of the markets and at 
development. For conventional orthodoxy, institutions must be almost exclusively limited to 
constitutional norms; for new developmentalism, economic policies and, more broadly, economic 
and monetary policy regimes, are institutions that require constant reform and adjustment within 
the framework of a more general strategy. Besides relatively permanent institutions, industrial 
policies are needed. They do not stand as a fundamental difference between new 
developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy, because new developmentalism uses industrial 
policy more moderately, topically and strategically, where the firm in need of support indicates 
that it has or will have the ability to compete internationally: an industrial policy that can be 
mistaken with protectionism is not acceptable.  
Neo-developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy share many institutional reforms in 
common. But their objectives often differ. Take, for example, the public management reform. 
New developmentalism advocates it because it longs for a more capable and efficient state; 
conventional orthodoxy does so because it sees an opportunity to reduce the tax load. For new  
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developmentalism this may be a desirable consequence, but this is a different matter. The tax 
burden is a political issue that depends chiefly on the functions democratic societies assign the 
state and, secondly, on the efficiency of public services. In other cases it is a matter of quantity. 
New developmentalism favors trade openness, but is not radical about it, knowing how to use 
international talks to secure reciprocal advantages, since the world markets are far from being 
free. In other cases, it is a matter of emphasis: both new developmentalism and conventional 
orthodoxy favor more flexible labor markets, but new developmentalism, based mainly on 
experiences from Northern Europe, does not take flexibility for lack of protection, while 
conventional orthodoxy renders labor more flexible to make working conditions precarious and 
help push down wages.  
1.1.1.6  Two tripods, compared  
In order to compare new developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy, let us examine the two 
pairs of tripods on which they are based: one pair of contradictory tripods concerned with 
development policy in general, and two pairs concerned with macroeconomic policy. 
The development tripod of conventional orthodoxy can be stated thusly: “A country will 
develop propelled by the forces of the market, as long as: (1) it keeps inflation and public 
accounts under control; (2) it performs market-oriented microeconomic reforms; and (3) it 
obtains foreign savings to finance development, given the lack of local savings.” On the other 
hand, the tripod of new developmentalism states: “A country will develop by exploiting the 
forces of the market, as long as: (1) it maintains macroeconomic stability; (2) it can rely on 
general institutions that strengthen the state and the market and on a set of economic policies that 
stand as a national development strategy; and (3) it is capable of promoting domestic savings, 
investment and firm innovation.”  
Chart 2: Development tripods, compared  
Orthodoxy  New developmentalism 
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Reform to strengthen the 
market 
Reform to strengthen the 
market and the state and have an 
industrial policy 
Secure foreign savings  Promote domestic savings and 
innovation 
 
I have already discussed item (2) of both tripods: for conventional orthodoxy, institutions 
are static; for new developmentalism, they re dynamic and make up a national development 
strategy. Let us now examine item (3). Item (1) will be discussed in the second pair of tripods, 
the one related to macroeconomic policy. 
For conventional orthodoxy, the need for foreign savings is central. According to 
Washington and New York, developing countries will only achieve growth if they can rely on 
rich nations’ capital. This is a central, unarguable point for conventional orthodoxy, it is a critical 
assumption. Quoth orthodoxy: ‘it is natural for capital-rich nations to transfer their capitals to 
capital-poor countries. This vision has always been prevalent among economists and economic 
policy-makers of rich nations. In the 1970s, for the first time, foreign savings became abundantly 
available to developing countries. They took advantage of this ‘opportunity’ and the outcome was 
the great foreign debt crisis of the 1980s. In the early 1990s, when the foreign debt crisis was 
finally relatively resolved, a new wave of capital flows to developing countries begins, now 
within the framework of neo-liberal globalization, of openness not only in trade terms, but also of 
the capital account. In this context, Washington and New York do not dally but announce the 
new truth: ‘o economic development is a great competition among developing countries to see 
who gets the most access to foreign savings.’ The countries that most actively and faithfully 
dedicate to confidence building before their New York creditors and the Washington authorities, 
those that best follow their directions, will be those to achieve development, because they will 
benefit the most from foreign loans and direct investment.  
New developmentalism rejects the notion that medium development countries need 
foreign savings to grow. And more: it understands that the strategy of growth with foreign  
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savings is the ideological stand-in for the law of comparative advantages in the process of 
neutralizing medium development countries’ development. History teaches us that countries 
develop almost exclusively from domestic resources. At certain times, when investment 
opportunities are very large, current account deficits may beneficially speed up development, but 
these are exceptional circumstances. Normally, resorting to foreign savings, that is, to current 
account deficits, should be very restrained for two reasons. One is obvious: foreign debt can all 
too easily lead to balance of payments crises. And a more arcane reason, whose analysis has been 
the focus of my attention in the past few years: current account deficits are compatible with 
appreciated foreign exchange rates, artificially raising wages and consumption and reducing 
domestic savings, so that, ordinarily, when the expected rate of return is not particularly high, the 
inflow of foreign savings implies massive substitution of domestic with foreign savings. As a 
consequence, the country’s development is little or none in the short term because of the capitals 
inflow and, in the meantime a burden is created in terms of debt and profits and interest 
remittance in the future, wit ha sure negative impact on growth.
23 
For conventional orthodoxy, chronic current account deficits and high foreign debt would 
be a ‘natural’ circumstance for developing countries; for new developmentalism, this is neither 
natural nor necessary, and the countries that develop the most — Asian countries — have been 
parsimonious in their use of foreign savings. The usually grow from foreign ‘negative savings’, 
that is, from current account surpluses. They receive direct investments, as do, by the way, rich 
nations, not to finance current account deficits, but, rather, as a reciprocation of investments 
abroad or increased reserves. 
Macroeconomic policy also lies on two conflicting tripods. The conventional tripod 
argues that: “macroeconomic stability, understood essentially as control over inflation,  is assured 
as long as: (1) the government controls its expenses, attaining a much-needed ‘primary surplus;’ 
(2) the sole purpose of the Central Bank is to control inflation, and its sole instrument is the 
interest rate, whose levels are not of import; and (3) the foreign exchange rate is floating within 
                                                 
23 I have been criticizing the growth with foreign savings strategy since the beginning of the decade. See, 
mainly, Bresser-Pereira (2002, 2004), Bresser-Pereira and Nakano (2002 [2003]), and Bresser-Pereira and 
Gala (2005).  
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the framework of an open capital account”. The neo-developmentalist macroeconomic tripod, in 
turn, argues that macroeconomic stability, understood to be inflation under control, moderate 
interest rates, and an exchange rate that assures foreign accounts’ intertemporal stability, will be 
attained as long as: (1) the government controls its expenses and public deficit, achieving positive 
public savings to finance its investments; (2) the Central Bank’s task is two-fold: to control 
inflation and to keep the balance of payments in balance; and it has two instruments: interest rates 
and foreign exchange rates; and (3) the foreign exchange rate is managed to remain competitive, 
using capital controls for this purpose when needed, and the interest rate remains as low as 
possible with stable prices. 
Chart 3: Macroeconomic tripods, compared 
Orthodoxy  New developmentalism 
Get primary surplus   Get public savings 
Central Bank with one task, one 
instrument  
Central Bank with two tasks, 
two instruments 
Open capital account and 
float exchange rate  
Manage foreign exchange, using 
capital controls as needed 
 
For both views, macroeconomic stability is fundamental to development, and fiscal 
discipline is essential to stability. But the differences begin with the definition of stability. 
Employment level is an essential element of true macroeconomic stability. The US legislation 
that regulates the Federal Reserve Bank, states that the Fed’s objectives are not only controlling 
inflation and keeping satisfactory employment levels, but provides a third variable: a ‘moderate’ 
interest rate. Both new developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy advocate firm control over 
public accounts, but, for conventional orthodoxy, the main metric is the primary surplus. The 
purpose of this is to make sure that the debt-to-GDP ratio does not increase and provide an 
assurance to debtors. New developmentalism is more ambitious: it wants to control public deficit  
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 156   •   NOVEMBRO DE 2006   •   31 
and, further, to achieve positive public savings capable of financing all, or a significant portion, 
of the public investments required. 
While conventional orthodoxy defends a single Central Bank mandate — controlling 
inflation —, new developmentalism claims two mandates are needed: inflation and employment. 
While conventional orthodoxy sees no need for an upper limit to interest rates, new 
developmentalism wants monetary authorities to use their best efforts to keep interest rates low. 
Finally, a fundamental difference exists as regards the foreign exchange rate. For conventional 
orthodoxy, the market will deal with it, and, within the framework of a floating exchange rate, it 
is contradictory and counterproductive to try and manage it; for new developmentalism, this is 
the most strategic of all macroeconomic prices and, within reasonable limits or constraints, it can 
and must be managed. In order to manage the foreign exchange rate, the domestic interest rate 
has to be moderate, so as to allow purchasing reserves when capital inflows are too strong. At 
certain times, there may be a need to resort to capital controls. New developmentalism is in favor 
of these at the present time, along the lines of what Chile did in the 1990s.  
Each one of the above points is deserving of a lengthy analysis, which, however, goes 
beyond the scope of this article. I do, however, note that the conventional macroeconomic tripod 
has strong influence from the growth with foreign savings strategy that became prevalent in the 
1990s. Before, the IMF was concerned with foreign exchange rates and, during balance of 
payments crises, in addition to demanding fiscal adjustments, always demanded foreign exchange 
depreciations. Since the 1990s, however, the IMF forgot current account deficits (they were 
foreign savings, after all...) and exchange rate depreciations. The twin deficits hypothesis 
exempted it from worrying about current account deficits: all it had to do was concern itself with 
the primary surplus. For a while it chose to talk about foreign exchange anchors and 
dollarization; after the strategy failed in Mexico, in Brazil and, above all, in Argentina, the IMF 
turned to full-floating exchange to solve all external problems. The new developmentalism is 
strongly critical of this perspective and wants control not only over the state’s public accounts 
(public deficit), but also over the nation’s total accounts (current account); it wants not only the 
state’s debt to be low, but also the state to show positive public savings; it also wants a nation-
state to have foreign accounts that assure its national security and autonomy. It wants not only  
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interest rate management, but also foreign exchange rate management, even if within the 
framework of a floating rate regime that it does not call ‘dirty’, as conventional orthodoxy is 
wont to, but ‘managed’, instead. 
1.1.1.7 Conclusion   
What are the results of the two policies? The outcome of conventional orthodoxy in Latin 
America is well known. Since 1990, at least, the truth from Washington and New York became 
hegemonic in this region marked by dependence. Reforms and adjustments of all sorts took place, 
but no development ensued. The results of new developmentalism in Latin America, in turn, 
cannot be measured. Chile has used it, but is a small country, and its policies are halfway 
between one strategy and the other. The Argentina of Kirschner and former Finance Minister 
Roberto Lavagna is the only concrete experiment, but far too recent to enable an objective 
appraisal. Still, new developmentalism is more than proven, because the strategy Asia’s dynamic 
countries have been using is none other. 
Can new developmentalism become hegemonic in Latin America as developmentalism 
was in the past? The conventional proposal’s failure assures me that yes, it can. Argentina’s 2001 
crisis was a turning point: the requiem of conventional orthodoxy. No country was more faithful 
in the adoption of its prescriptions, no president was ever more dedicated to confidence building 
than Menen. The results are common knowledge. On the other hand, neo-developmentalist 
thinking is renewing itself. It has available a younger generation (as compared to my own or even 
Nakano’s) of excellent economists that are graduating above all in Brazil. In Argentina and Chile 
too there are eminent economists that identify with this strategy, such as Osvaldo Sunkel, Aldo 
Ferrer, Ricardo French-Davis and Roberto Frenkel. There is, however, an issue of ideological 
hegemony to resolve. Latin American countries will only resume sustained development if their 
economists, businessmen and state bureaucracy recall the successful experience that old 
developmentalism was, and reveal themselves capable of taking a step ahead. They have already 
criticized the former mistakes, and realized the new historical facts that affect them. They must 
now acknowledge that the national revolution that was under way, with the old developmentalism 
as national strategy, was brought short by the great crisis of the 1980s and by the neo-liberal  
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ideological wave from the North. They must perform an in-depth diagnosis of the near-stagnation 
that conventional orthodoxy caused. They must turn an attentive eye towards the national 
development strategy of dynamic Asian countries. They must become involved in the great 
collective national work that is formulating the new developmentalism — the new national 
development strategy for their countries. I believe that this resumption of awareness is fully under 
way. Latin America’s development has always been ‘national-dependent’ because its elites were 
always in conflict and ambiguous, now affirming themselves as a nation, now yielding to foreign 
ideological hegemony. There is a cyclical element to this process, however, and everything seems 
to indicate that the time of neo-liberalism and conventional orthodoxy has passed, and new 
perspectives are opening up to the region. 
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